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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782-2(3) (j)
This is a negligence action in which defendant State of Utah
was granted summary judgment which was followed by a jury trial
in which judgment was granted in favor of the remaining defendants Jimmy Ray Lingle and Roadrunner Trucking.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the trial court correctly found there was no issue
of material fact produced by plaintiff that defective highway
design, if any, was a contributing cause of the accidnet.
RULES
Rule 30(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff Fay Gaw while turning left onto highway 6 in
Helper, Utah, drove into the path of a truck driven by defendant
Jimmy Ray Lingle and owned by defendant Roadrunner Trucking.
Plaintiff fs pleadings alleged that she was confused because
the State had negligently designed, constructed and maintained
the road.

Plaintiff further alleged that defendant Lingle

negligently operated his truck.

1

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
State of Utah which was followed by a jury trial in which judgment was granted in favor of the remaining defendants.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Just before the accident, on April 16, 1984, plaintiff

was stopped at the stop sign at Poplar Street where it intersects
Highway 6 at Helper, Utah.
southbound on Highway 6.

She intended to turn left and proceed

Although a left turn merge lane was

available to her, she proceeded past it and into the southbound
through lane into the path of defendant Lingle's truck.
(Deposition of Fay Gaw, pp. 28-35 and 37; Deposition of
Christman, pp. 18-19, 21-23.)
2.

Plaintiff alleged that the State of Utah negligently

designed, constructed and maintained the intersection because
insufficient directions confused her.

(R. 508, ff 12 and 22.)

3.

During her deposition, plaintiff testified:

A.

If we hadn't gone up [to Helper] for a little
while, why, they looked like they had changed the
lines again or added a new line or something, so
you never know what they're doing.

Gaw Deposition, p. 53.
Q.

(By Mr. Ogilvie) Have you had any problems with
the changes?

A.

No.

Gaw Deposition, p. 54.
Q.

(By Mr. Ogilvie) Mrs. Gaw, when you entered the intersection on the day of the accident, were you confused
by anything.
2

A.

No, cause I had driven that two or three times or more.

Gaw Deposition, pp. 54-55.
Q.

(By Mr. Ross) Do you have any memory about whether or
not, at the time of the accident, you were confused by
the lane markings?

A.

No, I don't.

Q.

(By Mr. Sullivan) I want to make sure you are clear on
that last question he was asking you. At this time,
okay, do you have any memory or do you feel that you
were confused by any of these lines in this intersection?

A.

Not that I remember. There was - they didn't ever
bother me before and I don't remember.

Gaw Deposition, pp. 80-81.
4.

This defendant filed its motion for summary judgment on

March 15, 1988.

(R. 797.)

On March 24, 1988, plaintiff served

her answers to this defendant's interrogatories.

In her answers,

she stated that she was unable to refer to any document, source,
or reference setting forth what standards she contends defendant
did not follow or should have followed with regard to design,
construction, care or maintenance of the intersection.

Plaintiff

further answered that she was unable to state whether she had any
evidence that the state violated any known published standards
pertaining to design, construction, care or maintenance of
intersection.
5.

(R. 1313.)

On May 8, 1986, plaintiff filed a motion, unsupported

by affidavit, to extend the time in which to sign and file her
deposition, because "during the process of reviewing the deposi-
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tion, it was learned that plaintiff was suffering from a diabetic
condition" and that because of her condition, "it will take a
significant amount of time to make the needed corrections in the
deposition."
6.

(R. 263.)

Plaintiff made numerous and substantial changes to both

the form and substance of her testimony.

( R. 732-36.)

(Deposition correction sheets attached as Exhibit "A.")

Plain-

tiff changed her deposition in every respect relating to her
testimony that she had not been confused by the highway design.
The attempted changes which affected this defendant were:
(a)

When asked if she was quite familiar with the

intersection, she responded "Yes, I was quite familiar with the
whole city of Helper, all around."
5.

Gaw Deposition, p. 52, line

Plaintiff changed that response to "I was not familiar with

the intersection."

The reason given for the change was "for they

had changed it."
(b)

When asked if she had any difficulties driving in

and through that intersection, plaintiff answered, "No, because
that was before they made that a freeway-like, and it was just a
regular old road."

Gaw Deposition, p. 52, line 15.

Plaintiff

tried to change that answer to "Yes, it was very confusing." The
reason given for the change was "they changed the lines again."
(c)

When asked whether she was aware of changes when

changes were made plaintiff responded "Oh, yeah.
follow your lane.

You had to

When you was in one lane, you followed it

4

until it ran out."

Gaw Deposition, p. 53, line 17.

That answer

was changed to read "No, they change the lines so much."

The

reason given for the change was "you would be very confused."
(d)

When asked "Have you had problems with the

changes?" the plaintiff simply answered "No."
54.

Gaw Deposition, p.

That answer was changed to "Yes I have had trouble with the

changes."

The reason given for the change in testimony was "they

were very confusing."
(e)

When asked whether she was confused by anything

when she entered the intersection the day of the accident, plaintiff answered "No, cause I had driven that two or three times or
more. . . . "
question."
7.

That answer was changed to "I didn't understand the
The reason given for the change was "I was confused."

Defendants Lingle and Roadrunner filed a motion to

suppress the deposition changes based upon the argument that the
changes had not been made in compliance with Rule 30(e) of
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R. 411.)

Plaintiff's response,

unsupported by affidavit, was that she had learned that she was
diabetic after her deposition was taken but before she signed it.
The plaintiff "believed" her testimony was distorted due to her
undiagnosed medical condition.

(R. 489.)

The State of Utah also

filed a motion to suppress the deposition changes and filed
hospital records showing that the plaintiff had been on medication for diabetes long before her deposition was taken.
574.)

5

(R.

The trial court granted the defendants1 motion to

8.

suppress the deposition changes.
9.

(R. 771.)

After the trial court suppressed the deposition

testimony changes, the plaintiff filed her affidavit in opposition to this defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment.

(R. 1093.)

(A copy of the Affidavit is attached as Exhibit "B".)

The state

filed a motion to strike the affidavit.
10.

(R. 1108.)

In addition to the attempted deposition changes, plain-

tiffs submitted the 3/29/88 and 4/18/88 affidavits of David
Beaufort in & opposition to the State's motion for summary judgment.1

Mr. Beaufort is a traffic engineer and accident

reconstructionist.

The Beaufort affidavit states that

"additional driver guidance needed to be provided to meet recommended standards of care of the traffic engineering profession."
The affidavits do not state what additional guidance was needed
nor identify any standard which requires such additional driver
guidance.

(R. 852, copy attached as Exhibit "C".)

filed a Motion to Strike the affidavit.
11.

The State

(R. 1101.)

Plaintiff also submitted the affidavit of Howard

Anderson, a licensed engineer, who opined that the design of the
intersection in question "is totally in conflict with normal
engineering practices. . . .

In my opinion, this highway design

led to confusion on the part of Mrs. Gaw, and was a contributing

1

In its Minute Entry of 5/16/88 the Court denied plaintiff's
motion to extend time for filing the second Beaufort affidavit.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SUPPRESSED
PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION CHANGES FOR FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH RULE 3 0(e).
Plaintiff testified unequivocally in her deposition that she was
familiar with this intersection and was not and never had been
confused by its design.

Plaintiff so answered even when ques-

tioned by her own attorney.
Rule 30(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that:
Any changes in form or substance which the witness
desires to make shall be entered upon the deposition by
the officer with a statement of the reasons given by
the witness for making them. . . . If the deposition
is not signed by the witness within 30 days of its
submission to him, the officer shall sign it and shall
state on the record the fact of the waiver. . . .
The changes plaintiff attempted to make in her deposition
were not made upon the deposition by, nor sworn to before, the
officer.

Nor was the deposition signed within 30 days of its

submission to plaintiff.

Plaintiff did make a motion for

extension of time, unsupported by affidavit, claiming that plaintiff between the time of her deposition and the signing of it had
been diagnosed as diabetic.

Defendants refuted that claim with
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h o s p i t a l r e c o r d s showinq that plaintiff w a s b e i n g t r e a t e d for
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Plaintiff testified unequivocally in her deposition that

she was not confused by the intersection.

Her subsequent deposi-

tion changes, in her own hand and unsworn, completely retracted
her deposition testimony making it useless and depriving the
state of its opportunity to cross-examine.
After her deposition changes were suppressed, plaintiff
filed her affidavit attempting the same changes in testimony the
court had already suppressed.

In Willco Kuwait (Trading) S.A.K.

v. DeSavory, 638 F. Supp. 846 (D.R.I. 1986), remanded in part on
other grounds, affirmed in part, 843 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1988), an
affidavit which attempted to make substantive changes in a deposition was held inadmissible because it would have deprived the
opposing party of an opportunity to cross examine the witness.
The first excuse for changing her testimony was medical
disability.

When that was disproven by her medical records she

never again mentioned it.
fused" theory.

Instead, she adopted the "I was con-

If she was referring to confusion at the time of

the accident, then she has given no reason at all for changing
her deposition testimony as the rule requires.

If she was refer-

ring to confusion during the deposition, it is certainly not
apparent in the record.

She was asked by two defense attorneys

as well as her own attorney whether the intersection was confusing and she said "no."

If she was confused during the deposition

it was her attorney's obligation to clear up any confusion then.
Any other rule would allow an attorney to sit idly by while his
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY DIS REGARDING
ENGINEERING AFFIDAVITS WHICH DID NOT COMPLY
WITH RULE 56(e).
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tiie intertraffic
of trafHelper

Nevertheless, he opines that a signal at one of the three Helper
intersections should be installed.

Based upon Mr. Anderson's own

admissions within the affidavit that he has insufficient facts
upon which to base an opinion, the affidavit is meaningless.
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states:
(e) Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would
be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein.
Mr. Anderson's Affidavit does not meet the requirements of
Rule 56(e).

He admits lack of personal knowledge and competence

to testify.

Nor does he set forth facts as would be admissible

in evidence.

The affidavit contains nothing but unsubstantiated

conclusions.
In Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983), the Utah
Supreme Court affirmed a grant of summary judgment for the defendant even though the plaintiff filed her own affidavit in opposition to the motion.

The Court held that since the plaintiff's

statements in the affidavit concerning fraud were conclusory and
did not specify what words were spoken by the defendant, the
statements would not be admissible in evidence and could not be
considered on summary judgment.

See also Treloggan v. Treloggan,

699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985) (affidavits on information and belief
revealed no evidentiary facts, but merely reflected affiants
unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions which were insufficient
to raise an issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.)
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The trial court correctly disregarded the affidavits because
they did not meet rule 56(e) requirements.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff testified unequivocally that she was not
confused by the intersection.

Her answers to interrogatories

state she is "unable" to identify any evidence that the intersection design violated any standard or regulation.

Affidavits

submitted by plaintiff did not comply with Rule 56(e) nor did
they set forth what the State did or should have done which
violated any standard.

Therefore the trial court correctly ruled

that there was no evidence that defective highway design, if any,
caused the accident and the summary judgment in favor of the
State should be affirmed.
DATED this //

day of September, 1989.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

JON lA ^Sanders
Aytoineys for Defendant State
jbf Utah
JLS438
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DEPOSITION CORRECTION SHEET
DATE:

March 1 4 , 19 86

CASE NO.:

Fay Gaw
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S t a t e of U t a h ,

etal.

Mrs. Gaw

AFTER REVIEWING THE TRANSCRIPT OF YOUR DEPOSITION, PLEASE
FILL OUT THIS CORRECTION SHEET INDICATING ANY CHANGES YOU DEEM NECESSARY.
THIS IS A VERBATIM RECORD OF WHAT WAS ACTUALLY SAID AND NO
GRAMMATICAL CORRECTIONS SHOULD BE MADE. IF THERE ARE CORRECTIONS OR
INSERTIONS, PLEASE INITIAL THE CORRECTION SHEET AND BRIEFLY STATE YOUR
REASONS THEREFOR. FOR EXAMPLE, SPELLING ERROR, CLARIFICATION, TRANSCRIBER
ERROR, ET CETERA.
PLEASE DO ALL CORRECTIONS WITH TYPEWRITER OR BLACK INK.
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Exhibit B

DANIEL F. BERTCH - A4728
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FAY GAW,
i

AFFIDAVIT OF FAY GAW

i

Civil No. 14630

Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH, et al.
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
Fay Gaw, having been first duly sworn on oath,
states as follows:
1.

I am the plaintiff in this lawsuit.

2.

At the time of the accident I thought I was

turning left into the left turn merge lane.
said at my deposition.
in the merge lane.

This is what I

I thought that I was hit while I was

Based on that impression, I stated at my

deposition that I was not confused.
Later on in the deposition, someone told me that
the accident happened in the through lane.

At that point,

I

said I did not remember whether I was confused at the time of
the accident.
4.

If

I was

actually

turning

left

into

the

through lane, I was confused because I thought I was turning
into the left turn merge lane when in fact I was turning into
the through lane,

I tried to change my deposition answer to

state this.
5.

The pavement lines at that intersection were

always confusing,
6.

I said this at my deposition.

Some of the answers I gave at my deposition

were mistaken, or confused.

After reviewing my deposition

answers, I attempted to make the corrections listed on the
attached correction sheets.
DATED this

J? /

day of

/yytg^uc^j

, 1988.

FAY GAW

of

Subscribed and sworn t o before me t h i s

/tfd.ntU

, 1988.

My Commission Expires:

jsidin^at;

3/

T(rv<t> /M-

day

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on the

£g%r of "fl\m>k ,

1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
FAY GAW, (Gaw v. State of Utah) postage prepaid, by depositing a copy of the same in the U.S. mail, to the following:
Joy Sanders
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah
Clifford C. Ross
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Doug Bayly
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
175 South West Temple #510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

^K'HU/IJJ{

Exhibit C

DANIEL F. BERTCH - A4728
ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4001 South 700 East, Fifth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah
84107
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FAY GAW,
Plaintiff,

)|

AFFIDAVIT OF
DAVID BEAUFORT

i

Civil No. 14630

VS.

STATE OF UTAH, et al.
Defendants.

David Beaufort, being first duly sworn -upon oath,
deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am a Traffic Engineer and Accident Recon-

structionist employed by Wayne T. VanWagoner and Associates,
Inc.

(WVW),

engaged

in

specialty

engineering

regarding

traffic safety.
2.

Wayne T. VanWagoner and Associates, Inc. has

been retained by the law firm of Robert J. DeBry & Associates.

I have inspected and surveyed the accident scene

where a collision occurred between vehicles driven by Fay
Gaw and Mr. Lingle.

3.

The accident scene geometry and delineation

pattern had not changed from the time of the accident to the
time of the survey of the accident intersection conducted by
WVW.

The State of Utah's response to interrogatories is the

basis for my conclusion, which states that the only change to
the intersection was an addition of a solid white channelizing stripe for west to southbound left-turning traffic from
Poplar Avenue.

This channelizing stripe existed at the time

of the WVW survey.

There were no arrows defining or guiding

traffic into the left turn merge lane to continue southbound
on SR 6 at the time of the WVW survey.
4.

The

inconsistent

intersection

geometry

and

channelization techniques at the intersection did not provide
adequate

information

expectancy,

and

to

to

meet

provide

a

left-turning

adequate

positive

driver's
guidance.

Therefore, additional driver guidance needed to be provided
to

meet

recommended

standards

of

care

of

the

traffic

engineering profession.
5.

The importance of meeting a driver's expectan-

cy and the importance of positive guidance has been documented for many years.

"The results of this research point

strongly to the fact that good driver communication is only
achieved by proper coordination among all roadway and terrain
features

and

the

devices

used
2

to

guide, warn, direct,

regulate or control traffic operation"

(1) page

*

In this

s a m e F e d e r a l H i g h w a y /Viun n i st rat i^ii Inpoit , I In

reduction

stated:

highway

"Existing communication

and the driver are sometimes
the

£ o J 1 o w 1 ng reasoi is

message,

thus

systems between the

inadequate

for one or more of

( 2 ) fa :i ] i ire t.o • *>nvpv a clear

leading

the

driver

to

make

ar-

.ncorrect

decision resulting

in improper maneuvers and sometimes

of control

"« eh Lc.le ' ( 1 ) p ,

ol

Ins

I

loss

The conclusions

from

this widely recognized report emphasize the interrelationship
between

individual

design

criteria.

" Whei i

cons i ciered

separately, tbp various elements that go together to make up
the total design generally result in a design that

satisfies

all the minimum criteria, bi :it dc: es n : • t necessarily meet the
requirements

of

the driver"

(1) p

12.

This

intersection

does not meet the requirements o f v d r i v e r turning

left

from

which

was

Poplar St reel:.
b.
identified
nificant

The
during

wi:

i*~i'
the

of

driver

accident
'

I lip

guidance,

srerip

|IHI spectivt

starting from the stop sign on the east
and

proceeding

to

cross.

This

inspection

is
v

sigdriver

leg of Poplar Avenue

approach

of

examining

and

visi ia.1 i zi i ig the clesi gi i f i: om 1:1: le dr i ver ' s perspective has been
emphasized in the evaluation of a design,

A 1975 publication

by the Federal Highway Administration states
3

The geometric

design, the traffic

interaction, and the traffic control

devices all need to be examined from the driver's eye level
to determine what expectancies are being created and whether
these expectancies are reinforced or violated" (2) p. 48.
REFERENCES
1.

Driver Expectancy Checklist, A Design Review Tool,
American Associates of State Highway Officials,
1972.

2.

Positive Guidance in Traffic Control.
Department of Transportation, 1975.

U.S.

FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this

^ 9

day of

C

ffi&AsU^

, 1988

t)AVID BEAUFORT
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
of

^(/lA^Ji^

day

1988.

'NOTARY P U B L I C '
Residing at:
My Commission Expires:

V

<] I

4

<5S)

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on the o?*7 day <

'/)I//f/j2/{_

,^ a ^

true copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID BEAUFORT, (Gaw
v. State of Utah) was mailed, postage prepaid, by depositing
a copy of the same in the U.S. mail,, to the following:
Joy Sanders
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah
Clifford C. Ross
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Doug Bayly
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
175 South West Temple #510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

(ssZ)

Exhibit D

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
CARBOH COUNTY. U7AH
FILED

HAY 12 1383
NORMAL POCHARD. CLERK
DEPUTYa

DANIEL F. BERTCH - A4728
ROBERT J . DEBRY - A0849
ROBERT J . DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for P l a i n t i f f
4001 S o u t h 700 E a s t , F i f t h F l o o r
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84107
Telephone:
(801) 262-8915

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FAY GAW,
Plaintiff,

]
|
)

vs.

;

STATE OF UTAH, et al.

]
)

AFFIDAVIT OF HOWARD
ANDERSON

Civil No. 14630

Defendants.
STATE OF UTAH

)

)ss:
COUNTY O F SALT LAKE)
COMES N O W Howarc 3 A i idei: s oi i, a £ t ei: f I r s t be ing duly
s w o r n , deposes a n d s a y s :
1
P l a n t lit I n i l

M y name is Howard Anderson.
[ M I vi« , i\ «? '-< " i f i t y , Nn va< la

• 1 my

1

I am a licensed engineer and have testified as

2
an expert

M y address is 111

highway design approximately o ( 5
..
3

-

- -. -J' - .;-

times.

A copy

ttached.

I have been asked to review and analyze the

intersection of Poplar A v e n u e and Route fi in Helper,

Utah,

Specifically, I have b e e n asked to analyze t h e intersection

with regard to motorists turning left from Poplar Avenue onto
Route 6.
4.

I have been provided a diagram of the layout

of the Route 6-Poplar Avenue intersection.
of

that diagram

is attached to this affidavit.

reviewed the police reports and photographs.
the deposition of Fay Gaw and her affidavit.
the

traffic

court

traffic count.

A reduced copy

data

consisting

of

the

I have

I have read
I have reviewed
average

daily

These materials are customarily relied upon

by highway design professionals in analyzing the safety of an
intersection.
5.
the

I do not yet have complete accident data on

intersectionf

and

I do not have an hourly count of

traffic at the intersection.

Without an hourly count of

traffic, I cannot review signal warrants for the Helper area.
6.

In my opinion, the intersection design for

drivers turning left from Poplar Avenue onto Route 6 fails to
meet accepted standards of safety in highway design.

As a

result of these failures, the intersection is defective and
dangerous for motorists turning left onto Route 6.

The

reasons for my opinions are set forth in more detail in the
following paragraphs.

2

7.

There are three major intersections in Helper.

T h e y all have r e l a t i v e l y heavy turning m o v e m e n t s and all are
intersections
looking

at

onditions

without

the
on

traffic

Route

traf*

active

movements

6,

in

my

\t

^onVr < i 1 d e v i c e s .

and

the

opinion,

high

one

of

In

speed

road

the

three

intersecti ons shoi ;a 1 d be si gna ] izc= • d (i • 3 . hv€ • a 1:i:af f ic signal
installed) .
local

streets

Even
did

if traffic
not meet

movements

on

any one of

all the hourly warrants

the

for

a

s i g n a l , tin;,- signal should be installed b e c a u s e :
a,

A signal w o u l d

facilitate crossing

at the intersection.

movements

For example, a vehicle

must accelerate approximately 80 feet from the
stop bar
side

of

on Poplar A v e n u e
the

to clear the

intersection.

.This

far

requires

a

long gap in traffic and good judgment on the
part

of

the

local

drivers

crossing

this

t o t a l l y unpatrolled hi qh speed hi ghway.
ft signal
that

they

would
are

inform

motorists

entering

a

oiI Route 6

community

where

f requent tra f f i c con f 1 :i <::::t: s c ai I be expec ted.
c,

Most importantly, a signal at any one of the
Helper

intersections

would

provide

gaps for t he othei two intersections*
3

traffic

8.

The striping and the islands are inadequate

and pose a challenge to even a frequent user of the intersection.

An inxequent or first-time user can easily be mislead

into making the wrong decision.

Traffic leaving Poplar

Avenue and turning left onto Route 6 is a relatively high or
heavy movement of about 1200 vehicles per day.

At conven-

tional divided

highways such as Route 6, that left turn

movement would

be made onto the far side of the median

(shaded in red on the attached diagram), directly into the
through lane, or into an acceleration lane located directly
next to the through lane.

That would be a driver's normal

expectancy, and the normal intersection design.
9.

I have never seen a four legged intersection

with a merge lane on the near side of a median, except at
Helper, Utah.

Traffic turning left from Poplar Avenue onto

Route 6 must turn prior to reaching the divided island, and
at that point, conflicts with traffic turning left from Route
6 onto Hill Street.

ThiS left turn movement onto Hill Street

at times will block the movement of Poplar Avenue traffic
onto Route 6.
10.

The

intersection

layout

separates

traffic

traveling in the same direction with an island median, while
separating traffic traveling in opposite directions with a
4

stripe median.

This is totally in conflict with normal

engineering practices.

This conflict can and will fail to

meet reasonab] e dri v er expectancy.

I.. J • , ' \ion, this

highway design led to confusion on the part

f Mrs, Gawf and

was a contributing cause to the accident.
11.

final comment,

iavp not yet had an

opportunity to visit the accident scene
subject to some modification after

i—

*\ opinions are
«:

alysis

and obtain all the facts.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
^-fY)(uJ
_ , 1988.

of

/M

^

NOTARY /PUBLIC

Residing a t :

/r,NOT WW
PUBUC
\rf\

CommiS*»»pir8»(
ADO. 27.

7

5

^laJJ-sr^J?

.day

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on the

jday of_

1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF
HOWARD R. ANDERSON (Gaw v. State of Utah) postage prepaid, by
depositing

a copy of the same in the U.S. mail, to the

following:
Joy Sanders
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah
Clifford C. Ross
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
175 South West Temple, #650
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Doug Bayly
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
175 South West Temple #510
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

^lujri^ -idma

6

Exhibit E

SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
CARBON COUNTY. UTAH
FILED

JUrI-8 !2S3
II I THE SEVENTH: J ( JDICIAL DISTRICT C ^ ^ H ^ R u g i ^ | 9 ^ K C O U N T Y
STATE OF UTAHr
-CC^zL&&L*t
rrpHTY
FAY GAW,

Plaintiff,
vs,

STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its Department of Transportation,
CARBON COUNTY, CITY OF HELPER,
JIMMY WRAY LINGLE, ALLSTATE
INSURANCE COMPANY, an Illinois
corporation, and JOHN DOES I
through X,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTIONS FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

C ivi 1 No

4t?Jd

Defendants,
The defendant, State of Utah, has moved for summary
judgment in its favor contending that there are no issues of
material tdcl: relative to this defendant and that the plaintiff
has no cause of action against the State of Utah,

The Court

has received the parties' Memorandums of Legal point's and.
Authorities, considered the Affidavits submitted and the
published Depositions, and heard oral arguments of the parties
and rules on t 1: Ie State ' s M< :>ti oi: I a s h e r ei n a f tei
The State defendant has also moved

statf*d,
Court to

strike the Affidavit of Mr. Beaufort on several grounds. It
would appeal In I he Cuuit thai I he plai nl i f f has n H compile!
with Rule 2,8 of the Uniform Rules of Practice for the District
Court
the

n submitting the various memorandums and affidavits that
.-..'*

shn'lfp f-ho

Affidavits of Mr. Beaufort as it relates to the Motion of the
State since the Court feels that the Motion can be disposed of
without that necessity.
An examination of the Deposition of the plaintiff
shows that she was not confused by any of the lines on the
highway or anything else at the intersection prior to the
accident.

The statements are definite and the Court will not

allow her to change those statements by affidavits submitted
after the time of her deposition since she has offered no
explanation as to why she would be mistaken at the time of her
deposition.
The affidavits submitted to try to demonstrate that
there was a faulty highway design state conclusions without
foundation as to the highway design and they do not specify
what standards the State did not follow or should have followed
in this instance.
Therefore, the Court finds that it is undisputed
that the plaintiff was not confused by the highway design at
the time of the accident and that the plaintiff has been unable
to produce any evidence that the highway design was faulty and
that the faulty design, if any, caused the resulting accident.
Therefore, the Court concludes that the plaintiff
does not have a cause of action against the State of Utah and
grants the Motion for Summary Judgment and the attorney for the
2

State is directed to p r e p a r e a formal judgment in accordance
with this opi i :ii o n .
The d e f e n d a n t s , Lingle and Roadrunner Trucking
C o m p a n y , have also m a d e a motio n f o r s u mm a i: ;y j u d g me • i 1 1
contending that there are no genuine disputed issues of
material fact and that based upon those undisputed facts they
are entitled t<: • a judgment : of nc i :::ause of acti on.
It would appear to the Court that the first
affidavit of Mr• Beaufort, which the Court will not strike at
this time, does establish sufficient issues of fact that thi s
matter should be presented for trial and determination by a
fact finder.
Therefore. * 1 i*::: Court denies the Motion of Lingle and
Roadrunner for summary
plaintiff is instructed
with this decision.
DATED this

judgment and the attorney for the
p i: e p a r e a f o i: m a 1 <:> i: d e i: i i 1 a c c c • r d a n e e

'JF day

3

of June, 1988.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that I mailed true and correct copies of
the foregoing
JUDGMENT

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY

by depositing the same in the United States Mail,

postage prepaid, to the following:
Clifford C. Ross
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys at Law
650 Clark Learning Office
Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101

G. Steven Sullivan
Robert J. Debry
ROBERT J. DEBRY ASSOCIATES
Attorneys at Law
965 East 4800 So., Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

Daniel F. Bertch
Attorney at Law
6558 South Stanwick Road, #22
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

Joy Sanders
Jody Burnett
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

L. Rich Humpherys
Edward O. Ogilvie
CHRISTENSEN JENSEN & POWELL
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
510 Clark Learning Office Center Litigation Divison
175 South West Temple
236 State Capitol Buidling
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Lewis B. Quigley
MASCARO & QUIGLEY
Attorneys at Law
7434-South State, Suite 201
Midvale, Utah
84047
day of June, 1988.

DATED this
4f?^

Secretary

(f5s^

Exhibit F

(e) Submission to witness; changes; signing.
When the testimony is fully transcribed the deposition
shall be submitted to the witness for examination and
shall be read to or by him, unless such examination and
reading are waived by the witness and by the parties.
Any changes in form or substance which the witness
desires to make shall be entered upon the deposition by
the officer with a statement of the reasons given by
the witness for making them. The deposition shall then
be signed by the witness, unless the parties by
stipulation waive the signing or the witness is ill or
cannot be found or refuses to sign. If the deposition
is not signed by the witness within 30 days of its
submission to him, the officer shall sign it and state
on the record the fact of the waiver or of the illness
or absence of the witness or the fact of the refusal to
sign together with the reason, if any, given
therefore; and the deposition may then be used as fully
as though signed unless on a motion to suppress under
Rule 32(d)(4) [Rule 32(c)(4)] the court holds that the
reasons given for the refusal to sign require rejection
of the deposition in whole or in part.

Exhibit G

(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony;
defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or
certified copies of all papers or parts thereof
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto
or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits
to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers
to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading,
but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate,
shall be entered against him.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Respondent to the following on the 11th day of September, 1989.
ROBERT J. DEBRY
Robert J. DeBry & Associates
4001 South 700 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Robert R. Wallace
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
P.O. Box 2970
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2970
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